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BGP, the glue that holds the Internet together, is vul-
nerable to a series of attacks. Several incidents demon-
strate their recent materialization in the form of prefix
hijacks and route leaks [1]. The networking community
is well aware of the problem, with many solutions having
been proposed in the past two decades [2].
Motivation. Unfortunately, the most effective solu-
tions for BGP security remain largely undeployed [1].
This is fundamentally due to one (or more) of the follow-
ing reasons. First, they use cryptographic techniques that
are too computationally expensive for current routers.
Second, they require changes to BGP which, due to its
widespread adoption and the lack of a centralized author-
ity to mandate such change, makes migration difficult.
This problem could be overcome if network operators
were given the right incentives to migrate to a secure so-
lution. But this is also hard, particularly as several solu-
tions are not effective until there is wide adoption, while
others offer benefits to the Internet as a whole, but not to
its adopters.
Contribution. The separation of the routing control
problem from routers as advocated by Software-Defined
Networking (SDN) has been proposed as a solution for
BGP problems [3]. We posit this to be key to address
BGP security. As such, in this abstract we propose an
SDN architecture for secure routing.
Our solution — BGPSecX — is based on a Software-
Defined Internet Exchange (as SDX [4], an SDN-based
architecture targeting IXPs). Our design further includes
secure channels between the BGPSecX of different IXPs
that want to collaborate. The L2 nature of IXPs make
them a good fit for SDN, and its growing importance
(they number more than 350 today, and some carry as
much traffic as global Tier-1 ISPs [5]) turns them into a
compelling target. Recently, IXPs have started offering
value-added services to their members — such as Route
Server services — as a successful incentive to join. We
see BGPSecX as an additional value-added service.
BGPSecX will include four security defenses against
prefix hijacks. First, detection by means of ROA verifi-
cation using a RPKI infrastructure. The RPKI provides
a trusted mapping from allocated IP prefixes to ASes,
and can thus be used to create a whitelist mechanism to
filter hijacked routes. One problem of the RPKI is cover-
age, which is still small (less than 5% of all prefixes are
mapped). This motivates the next techniques. Second,
we include prefix filtering, another whitelist technique
used to filter bogus announcements. The idea is for an
AS to keep a list of prefixes announced by its customers
(which is usually possible) and discard announcements
of prefixes not on the list. The main challenge of this
technique is the lack of incentives, as this technique does
not protect an AS itself, but instead it protects the Inter-
net from attacks by its own customers [1]. However, the
secure channel will allow IXPs to communicate, and en-
able the creation of white lists of clusters of IXPs, which
can be seen as a more attractive solution. Third, queries
between IXPs will be used for validation of routing in-
formation (inspired by [6]). Fourth, we will explore the
use of well-know anomaly detection mechanisms [2] and
use them at an inter-IXP scale.
We believe our proposal to be capable of addressing
the three fundamental problems mentioned in the begin-
ning. First, by offloading control logic to the SDN con-
troller we remove the computational burden from routers.
Second, our solution does not require changes to the
protocol as the techniques only require BGP messages
to be intercepted. Finally, by offering BGPSecX as an
additional value-added service from an IXP, we grant
incentives for organizations to secure their interdomain
routing. As IXP members use the service, positive net-
work effects may be created increasing adoption by other
members. Also, techniques that offer little value to the
AS that implements them, such as prefix filtering, can
gain further relevance at the scale of clusters of IXPs.
Implementation. We implemented a first prototype
that mitigates prefix hijacking using a RPKI infrastruc-
ture, as a network application for both Floodlight and
ONOS. We are now in the process of validating our ini-
tial solution with the use of real BGP traces.
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